Their [Russian] particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they had carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent or peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire “rightness,” they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. … But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. … Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds a natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. —George Kennan’s Mr. X article (Long Telegram of 1946; “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Foreign Affairs (July 1947)).

A hundred and twenty years ago …, the Marquis de Custine, felt compelled to speculate … the ultimate destiny of a tyranny so vast and so ponderous as … in the empire of Nicolas I. … to take over the West and to teach us decadent Westerners … But the old Russian hands in the Petersburg diplomatic corps had, …, a different view. The destiny of Russian tyranny, …, was to expand into Asia — and eventually to break in two, there, upon its own conquests. … in the case of Soviet Russia a little bit of this happened as much as thirty-three years ago (i.e., the 1927 communist uprisings and mutinies). —George Kennan’s Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (1961).

All the great masterful races have been fighting races, and the minute that a race loses the hard fighting virtues, then, no matter what else it may retain, no matter how skilled in commerce and finance, in science or art, it has lost its proud right to stand as the equal of the best. … Diplomacy is utterly useless when there is no force behind it. The diplomat is the servant, not the master, of the soldier. There are higher things in this life than the soft and easy enjoyment of material comfort. It is through strife, or the readiness for strife, that a nation must win greatness. … No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war. — Pres. Theodore Roosevelt’s Speech at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island (June 2, 1897).